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Gershenfeld: Pre-Employment Dispute Arbitration Agreements: Yes, No and Maybe

COMMENTARY

PRE-EMPLOYMENT DISPUTE ARBITRATION
AGREEMENTS: YES, NO AND MAYBE
Walter J Gershenfeld*

I.

INTRODUCTION

The relatively straightforward world involving statutory rights (civil
rights and other protective labor legislation) and collective bargaining or
individual rights has been dramatically affected by the Gilmer v.
Interstate/JohnsonLane Corp.' decision and its progeny.2 Previously,
an agreement to arbitrate a dispute did not result in terminating the union
or individual right to proceed subsequently under statutory auspices.
Under Gilmer, finality of arbitration could become the norm, at least in
individual cases. The Gilmer decision will be discussed below in the
context of pre-employment agreements.
Both statutory and non-statutory claims under pre-employment
arbitration agreements will be covered in this Article. After briefly
reviewing the earlier approach to pre-employment arbitration agreements,
* Dr. Walter J. Gershenfeld is an arbitrator, mediator and factfinder. He is Emeritus Professor
of Industrial Relations at Temple University. Dr. Gershenfeld was 1995 President of the Industrial
Relations Research Association and has served as vice president of the National Academy of
Arbitrators.
1. 500 U.S. 20 (1991).
2. See Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36 (1974) (affirming an individual's right
to proceed with a statutory action).
We think, therefore, that the federal policy favoring arbitration of labor disputes and the
federal policy against discriminatory employment practices can best be accommodated
by permitting an employee to pursue fully both his remedy under the grievancearbitration clause of a collective-bargaining agreement and his cause of action under Title
VII.
Id. at 59-60.
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I will consider the Gilmer decision in relationship to the recent Dunlop
4
Commission3 and Protocol Task Force recommendations, positions of
appointing agencies and approaches by regulatory bodies. The differences
between statutory and non-statutory cases will be discussed and
recommendations made for both the present situation involving preemployment dispute arbitration agreements and a possible future scenario
based on legislative and/or court change. Emphasis will be placed on
quality standards for employment arbitration and the effect of their
presence or absence on mandatory employment arbitration.
II.

EARLIER

PRE-DISPUTE AGREEMENTS OR REQUIREMENTS
A.

Collective Bargaining

Collective bargaining agreements requiring arbitration of grievances
are the most common type of pre-employment arbitration agreement and
are routinely accepted by the courts. This is particularly true since the
1960 trilogy of Supreme Court cases emphasized the primacy of

negotiated arbitration agreements as the appropriate approach to the
resolution of workplace disputes.'

The relationship between labor-management contractual disputes and

existing law became an issue under the National Labor Relations Act in
cases involving both an alleged contractual violation as well as an
alleged unfair labor practice. The National Labor Relations Board
("NLRB") created a doctrine of deferral in the SpielbergManufacturing

Co.6 case-which was later amplified in other cases-calling for

acceptance of arbitral decisions in certain types of cases, so long as
7
enumerated conditions were met. These conditions included the
requirements that the arbitrator had addressed the statutory issue, the

hearing was fair and, in an attractive turn of phrase, the outcome was not

OF
COMMISSION ON THE FUTURE OF WORKER-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS, U.S. DEPT'S
COMMISSION].
[hereinafter
(1994)
RECOMMENDATIONS
AND
COMMERCE AND LABOR, REPORT

3.

4. A Due Process Protocolfor Mediation and Arbitration of StatutoryDisputes Arising Out
of the Employment Relationship, DISP. RESOL. J. Oct.-Dec. 1995 at 37 [hereinafter Due Process

Protocol]
5. See Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960); United Steelworkers v. Warrior

564
& Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); United Steelworkers v. United Mfg. Co., 363 U.S.

(1960).
6. 112 N.L.R.B. 1080 (1955).

7. See id. at 1082.
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"repugnant" to the Act.8 The standards support arbitration finality but
leave the door open for the NLRB to preserve statutory rights when these
rights require protection.
Stronger protection of statutory rights occurred in another case, but
it left room for arbitration to play an important role. Alexander v.
Gardner-DenverCo.9 arose under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
196410 ("Title VII") and involved a racial discrimination claim which
had been denied by an arbitrator.1 The Court affirmed an individual's
right to proceed with a statutory action,12 however-in what is usually
termed the "Famous Footnote 21"' 3-also
stated that an arbitrator's
14
decision could be afforded "great weight."'
Thus, Gardner-Denver preserved statutory rights and Spielberg
provided an important role for arbitration while maintaining NLRB
review, if needed. Recently, however, a federal circuit court has
introduced the possibility that a Title VII case going to arbitration under
a collective bargaining agreement may not qualify for a statutory appeal.
On March 12, 1996, the Fourth Circuit rejected the Gardner-Denver
approach when it held a voluntary agreement to arbitrate as providing
5
finality.
Federal employees have a choice of forum. Claims of contractual
and/or statutory violation can be taken to arbitration (assuming a
collective bargaining agreement is present), the Merit System Protections
Board or the Cognizant Anti-Discrimination Agency if a statutory claim
is present. State and local employees generally have the same type of
choice.
B.

Other ArbitrationArrangements

Individual employment arbitration agreements, typically between
executives and companies, have been in existence for some time.
Although no meaningful count is available, it is assumed that the number
of such agreements was relatively small until recently.

8. Id.
9. 415 U.S. 36 (1974).
10. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1994).
11. See Alexander, 415 U.S. at 42.
12. See id. at 59-60.
13. E.g., Neil H. Abramson, Comment, ArbitralDeference and the Right to Make andEnforce
Contracts Under 42 U.S.C. Section 1981, 82 Nw. U. L. REv. 109, 117 (1987).
14. Alexander, 415 U.S. at 60 n.21.
15. See Austin v. Owens-Brockway Glass Container, Inc., 78 F.3d 875, 885 (4th Cir. 1996).
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The same holds true for company or group-wide plans calling for
arbitration of employment disputes which are made available to
employees in non-union companies. The plans were often criticized,
particularly by the labor movement, because they failed to provide a fair
system for adjudication of disputes and attempted to circumvent union
organization.
The securities industry is the first instance where a nationwide set
of non-union employers in one industry organized themselves to provide
arbitration for the resolution of disputes in their field. The arbitration
plan was basically concerned with customer-broker disputes. Its terms,
however, also applied to all employees of member firms of the New
York Stock Exchange who were required to agree to take employment
disputes to arbitration as a condition of employment.
Thus, pre-employment dispute agreements to arbitrate exist under a
variety of circumstances. For a number of reasons, there are pressures for
continued growth in the use of arbitration for the resolution of these
disputes. Baseline pressures include cost and case overload at agencies
such as the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC").
Other sources of these pressures will be considered next.
1H.

COMMISSION, COURT, LEGISLATIVE, AND OTHER SUPPORT FOR
THE USE OF ARBITRATION IN EMPLOYMENT DISPUTES

A.

Legislation and Court Decisions

The federal government played a major role in creating the climate
which produced the Court's decision in Gilmer. The Administrative
Dispute Resolution Act of 199016 (now expired) permitted federal
agencies to use Alternative Dispute Resolution ("ADR") procedures if the
parties agreed. 7 The Civil Rights Act of 1991,18 the Americans with
Disabilities Act 19 and subsequent legislation encouraged the use of ADR
procedures. Nevertheless, the Gilmer decision surprised many observers
because of its rationale. The Court relied on the Federal Arbitration Act

16. 5 U.S.C. §§ 571-583 (1994).
17. An executive order encouraging ADR, including arbitration, was issued by President
Clinton on February 5, 1996. See Exec. Order No. 12988, 61 Fed. Reg. 4729 (1996). Shortly
thereafter a bill was signed into law, calling for ADR in federal government activity. See 5 U.S.C.A.
§571 (West, WESTLAW through 1996).
18. 42 U.S.C. § 1981a (1994).
19. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (1994).
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of 192520 which was written to encourage arbitration of contractual
disputes.2" Some observers believe it was not meant to include employment cases. However, others perceive its employment case limitation to
apply solely to the transportation field. In any event, the Court found that
Mr. Gilmer, whose complaint had to do with alleged age discrimination,
had signed the arbitration agreement known as a U-4. The Court
reasoned it did not have to reach the question of applicability of the U-4
agreement to an employment dispute since Mr. Gilmer's contract was not
between him and his employer but between him and a trade associati21

tion.

Interested observers split vigorously on the decision. Some members
of the plaintiffs' bar perceive it as an unwarranted intrusion of government in denying statutory rights to individuals. On the other hand,
members of the defendants' bar hail it as the wave of the future,
particularly if certain limitations on arbitral authority are present.
Lower courts, in some cases, extended Gilmer to other protectivelabor situations provided certain criteria were met, such as an appropriate
arbitration agreement, adequate communication about the nature of the
employment arbitration agreement from the employer to the prospective
employee and essential fairness. The application of the Federal Arbitration Act to employment agreements will sooner or later reach the
Supreme Court for a head-on decision. Meanwhile, the nature of
confusion among lower courts concerning extension of Gilmer is summed
up in the following two cases.
The Ninth Circuit refused to compel arbitration in a case involving
alleged sexual harassment in PrudentialInsurance Company ofAmerica
v. Lai.2 4 In that case, the employees signed a U-4 agreement, but the
court found that the employees had not been given background information and were not knowledgeable about the contract they had signed.2 5
On the other hand, the Southern District of New York found the U4 agreement applicable to compel arbitration. 26 There, the court

20. 9 U.S.C. 24, §§ 1-16 (1994).
21. See id. § 2; see also Gilmer v. Johnson/Interstate Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 24 (1991).
22. See Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 23.

23. See id. at 25 n.2.
24. 42 F.3d 1299, 1305 (9th Cir. 1994).

25. See id.
26. See Hall v. Metlife Resources, No. 94 Civ. 0358 (JFK), 1995 WL 258061, at *5 (S.D.N.Y.
May 3, 1995).
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emphasized that, barring fraud, a person who signed a contract was
presumed to understand what was being signed."
Overall, it is fair to say that the eighties and nineties witnessed a
gradual erosion of the employment-at-will doctrine. The bases for
rejection of the doctrine were contracts, express or implied (such as may
be found in an employees' handbook), public-policy violation and,
perhaps surprisingly, occasional findings by courts that a given dismissal
lacked essential fairness. In fact, by 1989 some forty-five states had
found an exception to the employment-at-will doctrine.
One effect of the growing interest in employment cases turned into
an unsuccessful attempt to have the states adopt legislation addressing
employee terminations. The National Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws, with the assistance of interested parties, drafted a
Model Employment Termination Act. 8 The legislation was meant to
apply to employers with five or more employees and adopted a goodcause requirement for terminations. 9 The standards were largely those
found in the Uniform Arbitration Act 0 (a 1995 proposal from the same
group which has facilitated states in modernizing their arbitration law)
and in arbitrations administered by an appointing agency, such as the
American Arbitration Association. The standards included equality in
choice of an arbitrator and advocate as between plaintiff and defendant
and some form of discovery. The proposed legislation did not provide
any remedy beyond reinstatement and/or back pay.
The legislation has not as yet been adopted in any state, except to
a partial degree in Montana. It clearly acted as a forerunner to Dunlop
Commission and Protocol Task Force deliberations, and I turn to these
as an important part of the background for the current situation involving
employment disputes in non-union settings. Quality standards for
employment arbitration will be considered in some detail because of their
effect on mandatory arbitration.

27.
28.
29.
30.

See id. at *3.
§§ 1-14, 7A U.L.A. 75 (Supp. 1996).
See id. § 1(2).
§§ 1-21, 7 U.L.A 2 (Supp. 1996).
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B. Dunlop Commission
The Dunlop Commission encouraged private dispute-resolution
systems as an alternative to litigation.31 It specifically recommended
forbidding pre-employment agreements to arbitrate public-law claims
(and, by inference, any employment claim, except on a voluntary
basis).32 At the same time, it urged the parties to consider binding
arbitration of claims after they arose.33 The Commission suggested that
employer plans calling for arbitration of employment disputes comply
with quality standards as follows:
a neutral arbitrator who knows the laws in question and understands the
concerns of the parties;
a fair and simple method by which the employee can secure the
necessary information to present his or her claim;
a fair method of cost-sharing between the employer and employee to
ensure affordable access to the system for all employees;
the right to independent representation if the employee wants it;
a range of remedies equal to those available through litigation;
a written opinion by the arbitrator explaining the rationale for the
result; and
sufficient judicial34 review to ensure that the result is consistent with the
governing laws.
'Some observers believe this portion of the Dunlop Commission
Report may turn out to be its most important contribution.
C. Protocol Task Force
The Commission Report was followed by an attempt to bring
interested parties together to find an ADR approach to the rapidly
mounting backlog of civil rights cases. The groups involved included
representatives of management and labor in the American Bar Associa-

31. See COMMISSION ON THE FUTURE OF NVORKER-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS, U.S. DEPT'S OF
COMMERCE AND LABOR, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS 27 (1994).

32. See id. at 33.
33. See id.
34. Id. at 31.
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tion's Labor and Employment Law Section, as well as individuals from
the American Arbitration Association, American Civil Liberties Union,
Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service, National Academy of
Arbitrators, National Employment Lawyers' Association and the Society
of Professionals in Dispute Resolution." In the resulting Due Process
Protocolissued May 9, 1995, the groups noted their disagreement on two
subjects.3 6 They failed to reach unanimity as to whether or not an
agreement to arbitrate could be valid pre-dispute, and what constituted
a knowing agreement to arbitrate.37
While the group considered various forms of ADR including
mediation, the emphasis here will be on their arbitration recommendations. Some of the recommendations regarding representation and costs
include: that employees should have access to a representative of their
choice;3" that claimants and their representatives will determine the
method of payment for the representative, although the task force
recommended employer compensation for at least some part of the
charges for low-wage individuals;39 and that payment of arbitration cost
is a matter for the parties to work out or the arbitrator will determine the
allocation of arbitration fees.40 Other considerations with respect to the
arbitrator involve: information about a prospective arbitrator's six most
recent cases; 41 that arbitrators should be knowledgeable about arbitration
and statutory requirements in the employment field;4' that arbitrators
should be free of bias for either party, although the parties should be able
to select an arbitrator who does not meet these qualifications if the
parties so desire; 43 the arbitrator should be able to award whatever relief
is available under the law;' and the scope of review should be limited.45 Finally, they recommended "[a]dequate but limited pre-trial

discovery .... 46

35. See A Due ProcessProtocolfor Mediation and Arbitration of Statutory Disputes, DISP.
RESOL. J., Oct.-Dec. 1995 at 37, 39.
36. See id. at 37.

37. See id. at 37-38.
38. See id. at 37.

39. See id.
40. See id. at 39.
41. See id. at38.

42. See id.
43. See id. 38-39.

44. See id. at 39
45. See id.
46. Id. at 38.
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IV.

APPOINTING AGENCY ROLES

The Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service is primarily
concerned with aspects of labor-management relations. Nevertheless, they
have provided arbitration panels for employment disputes in non-union
firms over a period of approximately ten years. The practice was halted
in 1995, and never amounted to more than fifty such panels in any one
year.
Two large appointing agencies handling both union and non-union
cases, the American Arbitration Association ("AAA") and
JAMS/Endispute ("JAMS"), illustrate the questions and issues raised by
the potential growth of employment cases. The emphasis is on potential
growth since the AAA, for example, still numbers the cases in the
hundreds.
Initially, the relatively few employment cases administered by the
AAA were treated as commercial cases. Unless the parties agreed
otherwise, this meant the arbitrator's first day of hearing was pro bono,
no written opinion was expected, and arbitrator fees paralleled commercial fees.
Commercial fees are generally lower than labor-management fees
inasmuch as commercial arbitrators are theoretically part-timers who
arbitrate on an occasional basis.
As the number of cases began to grow in the nineties, the AAA
created a separate employment panel and employment rules. Knowledge
of labor-management relations and arbitration were not deemed sufficient
to qualify for the new panel unless the individual could also display a
background in employment law. Some labor-management arbitrators
concluded that their knowledge of employment law was not the main
reason for their lack of utilization in employment cases. The problem
stemmed from the hesitation of plaintiff attorneys to use arbitrators
accustomed to the limited remedies in labor-management arbitration and
with defendant attorneys who were unhappy with the application of just
cause by labor-management arbitrators.
The current AAA National Rules for the Resolution of Employment
Disputes emphasizes the relative independence of employment cases from
commercial disputes.4 7 Cases may be initiated jointly or by either party
based on either an employment agreement or an employee handbook.4"
47. See AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASS'N, EMPLOYMENT DISPUTE RESOLUTION RULES (1993).
48. See id. at 12.
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Although a case can be submitted under a mandatory pre-employment
arbitration agreement, the AAA retains the right under the Rules to reject
cases not meeting their due-process standards.49 William Slate, president
of the American Arbitration Association, was quoted in the Wall Street
Journalas saying the AAA was "unlikely to refuse involuntary cases."50
However, a report on an employment ADR conclave held by the AAA
in September 1995 noted most appointing agencies, including the AAA,
would reject cases "which delete existing remedies from those which an
arbitrator may award."'" This foreshadowed the AAA's California rules,
essentially becoming its national norm.
The AAA rules require a prospective arbitrator to disclose anything
which might create a presumption of bias.5 Since advocate arbitrators
are on the panel, the AAA indicated that will identify their advocacy
roles in biographies sent to prospective parties. The rules provide for
discovery,53 a deposit for arbitrator payment prior to the hearing5 4 and
for the AAA to negotiate or set an arbitrator fee.5
The AAA, JAMS and other dispute providers came under fire from
the National Employment Lawyers' Association, an organization of
plaintiff attorneys, which announced a plan to "boycott private justice
providers that continue to hear involuntary cases after Nov[ember] 1,"
199556

The boycott will primarily apply to the AAA and JAMS, both of
which hear these cases.5 JAMS, which like the AAA is a nationwide
provider of dispute resolution services, is a major ADR actor on the West
Coast and dominates the arbitration market in California. 8 It has
responded to some of the issues raised by plaintiff attorneys; JAMS "will
only take those cases in which an employee retains the same avenues as
in court, including the right to obtain punitive damages for egregious
behavior, pre-hearing discovery and representation by counsel. 5 9

49. See id. at 12-13.
50. Margaret A. Jacobs, PoliciesRequiringArbitrationChallenged,WALL ST. J., Oct. 16, 1995,
at B5.
51. John True, New Rules for New Challenges, ARB. J., Oct.-Dec. 1995, at 30, 33.
52. See AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASS'N, supra note 47, at 7.

53. See id. at 14.
54. See id. at 22.
55. See id.
56. Jacobs, supra note 50, at B5.
57. See Jacobs, supra note 50, at B5.
58. See Margaret A. Jacobs, Workers CallSome PrivateJustice Unjust, WALL ST. J., Jan. 26,
1995, at BI.
59. Id.
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Furthermore, JAMS "implemented rules... that 'recommend' employers
pay 'all or most' of the cost of the arbitrators and that they request
written opinions from the arbitrators .... ,,60
In effect, JAMS accepts
pre-employment agreements to arbitrate if the plan meets the Due
ProcessProtocol standards.
Below is a table summarizing recommendations of the Dunlop
Commission and Protocol Task Force, along with the status of the
recommendations under AAA and JAMS rules. Aspects of the table will
be discussed below and considered in the recommendations regarding
mandatory arbitration which follow.
TABLE 1
ARBITRATION QuALrrY STANDARDS - NONUNIoN, STATUTORY CASES
Dunlop
Commission

Protocol Task
Force

American

Arbitration
Association

JAMS/
Endispute

Mandatory
Arbitration

No

No position

Yes, if due process present

Neutral,

Yes

Independent of

Panels may

Yes, if minimum standards
met
Panels may

bias

include

include

advocates

advocates

Knowledgeable

Arbitrator
Choice of
Advocates

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Discovery

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes
Full range
Equal or mumally acceptable
or arbitrator
determination
Limited

Yes
Full range
As provided in
plan

Yes
Full range
As provided in
plan Recommend equity

Written Opinion Yes
Remedies
Full range
Cost Sharing
Fair method

Appeal

Result consistent with governing law

Opinion may be Opinion not for
used in court
court JAMS
appeal possible

Major points of difference between the Dunlop Commission and the
Protocol Task Force recommendations as compared to the AAA and
JAMS include the acceptance of a case involving an involuntary party by
an appointing agency, the use of advocates as neutral arbitrators and
appeals.

60. Id.
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Neutral, Knowledgeable Arbitrator

All concerned agree that an arbitrator should be knowledgeable
about employment law, arbitration practice and neutral with regard to
parties in a given case.
Clearly, individuals trained in employment law can become
competent in arbitration and vice versa. There is, however, some
disagreement as to what knowledge of employment law covers. Some
authorities perceive a deep background in the field as required. Others
believe it should be at the same level as labor-management arbitrators,
i.e., sufficient knowledge to understand the nature of the field. Support
for this position comes from the fact that labor-management arbitrators
are frequently called upon to deal with statutory aspects of cases when
they are only generally familiar with the statute.
For example, few labor-management arbitrators are knowledgeable
with the specifics of state school codes or the Employee Retirement and
Income Security Act6 1 ("ERISA"). When the parties require the
application of these laws to the terms of a collective bargaining
agreement, they usually provide the arbitrator with sufficient information
to make an informed decision. Similarly, one would expect the parties in
a Title VII case to provide the arbitrator with the same type of information. One obvious problem is that the claimant may not be able to afford
counsel and will depend on a general argument with regard to discrimination. Most experienced arbitrators can handle that type of situation
without placing themselves in a position where they are helping one side
to make its case. Nevertheless, the situation above argues that the
Gardner-Denverapproach of access to statutory procedures following
arbitration may be needed for equity.
Neutrality raises a whole new set of questions. The acceptance of
advocates on arbitration panels appears to be based on their knowledge
of employment law and their lack of prior involvement with a given set
of parties. I note that it took a generation for appointing agencies in
labor-management cases to recognize that while the parties were always
free to select an advocate as an arbitrator in a particular case, they were
impacting the arbitration process negatively by listing such individuals
on their panels.

61. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1994).
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The same holds true in employment cases. I have been informed by
representatives of appointing agencies that advocates want to be listed as
neutral arbitrators and hear employment cases. The agencies report this
to be an implied threat-that if the advocates are not listed, they will
take their employment case business to an appointing agency which will
be more flexible. As will be seen in the recommendations below, I
believe the only appropriate long term approach for appointing agencies
is to close ranks and not list advocates as neutral arbitrators.
B.

Choice of Advocates

We have come a long way from the situation where an employee
was not permitted to select from outside the organization for an advocate.
Two types of individuals were at times specifically barred from
representing individuals in employment cases: lawyers and union
officials. Modem plans routinely afford the complainant a choice of
advocate; this is currently supported by appointing agency rules. Unions,
which frequently opposed non-union arbitration plans, are beginning to
identify claimant representation as a possible opportunity for union
organization of the group involved.
C. Discovery
General agreement appears to be emerging that "reasonable"
discovery is appropriate for employment cases. One problem is that the
term "reasonable" will have different meanings for different parties.
D. Remedies
Both the Dunlop Commission and the Protocol Task Force believe
62
the full range of statutory remedies must be available to an arbitrator.
Appointing agencies have come to agree with this position.

62. See A Due Process Protocolfor Mediation and Arbitration of Statutory DisputesArising
Out of the Employment Relationship, DISP. RESOL. J., Oct.-Dec. 1995, at 37, 39; COMMISSION ON
THE FUTURE OF wORKER-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS, U.S. DEPT'S OF COMMERCE AND LABOR,
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS 32 (1994).

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1996

13

Hofstra Labor and Employment Law Journal, Vol. 14, Iss. 1 [1996], Art. 5
Hofstra Labor Law Journal

E.

[ Vol. 14:245

Written Opinion

A written opinion, which adds to the cost of an arbitration, 63 may
in some cases require the approval of both parties. It raises the interesting
question of what should happen if one party seeks a written opinion and
is willing to pay for it separately. In any event, both the Dunlop
Commission and the Protocol Task Force recognized the need for at least
a summary opinion if the case involves application of a statute or is
subject to review.' Under these circumstances, it appears reasonable
that either party should be able to request either a full opinion or a
summary opinion. The question of cost will be addressed below.
F

Cost Sharing

In the past, employers routinely paid the cost of arbitration with the
exception of the claimant's direct expenses for representation. Some
arbitrators have reported dissatisfaction with one party paying all
expenses of the arbitration, and various new approaches have been tried,
including giving the claimant an opportunity to pay up to one half of the
cost of the arbitrator and/or arranging that the arbitrator not be aware of
the source of payment by having a neutral body provide an escrowed
payment.6'
Appointing agencies usually require the parties to pay one half the
cost of administration of the case and the arbitrator's charges unless the
agreement or the employer's plan provides otherwise.66 The hard fact
is that an employer is free to insist on a claimant paying half the cost of
an arbitrator, and the claimant may not be able to afford the payment.
One solution would be to provide that the arbitrator assess the cost of the
arbitration in some equitable fashion. Such assessment is not a task
desired by many arbitrators.

63. See Kirsten J. McDonough, Resolving FederalTax Disputes Through ADR, ARB. J., June
1993, at 38, 42.

64. See Due Process Protocol, supra note 62, at 39; COMMISSION, supra note 62, at 32.
65. See Due Process Protocol, supra note 62, at 39.
66. See AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASS'N, supra note 47, at 11.
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G. Appeal
The Dunlop Commission supported the right of parties to appeal the
arbitrator's decision in courts. The Protocol Task Force simply stated that
review should be limited.67
The Dunlop Commission approach is consistent with the NLRB use
of deferral.68 That is, unless the law has been clearly violated by an
Arbitrator's decision, the arbitrator's position should stand. On the other
69
hand, the Protocol Task Force called for a limited review. Limited
review can mean that charges such as fraud or lack of due process are
the only reasons to set aside an arbitration decision, and statutory error
is not a basis for judicial review. Some statutory review of employment
cases is considered desirable by this writer.
V. GOVERNMENT AGENCY APPROACHES
Government agencies administering statutes have generally made it
clear that they oppose (other than in connection with a collective
bargaining agreement) any pre-dispute requirement that a matter
involving the statute they administer be taken to arbitration on other than
a voluntary basis.
In April 1995, the EEOC affirmed its commitment to ADR
principles but specified that it would oppose pre-dispute agreements
requiring an individual to go to arbitration in connection with a statute
administered by the EEOC.70 The EEOC has had positive experience
with outside mediators, although it does not have any funds for that
purpose. Therefore its dispute resolution emphasis will likely center, at
least for the immediate future, on voluntary, pro bono mediators.
Encouragement of voluntary arbitration in discrimination cases has
occurred recently in Massachusetts.7 1 Following discussions with Arnold
Zack, one of the co-chairs of the Protocol Task Force, the Massachusetts

67. See Due Process Protocol,supra note 62, at 39.
68. See COMMISSION, supra note 62, at 32; see also Spielberg Mfg. Co., 112 N.L.R.B. 1080
(1955).
69. See Due Process Protocol, supra note 62, at 39.
70. See Paul S. Miller, EEOC Adopts ADR Methods, DisP. RBSOL. J., Oct.-Dec. 1995, at 17,
17.
71. See Rick Valliere, Discrimination:MassachusettsAgency Will Be Firstto Offer Arbitration
ofEEO Disputes, 5 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) A-I (Jan. 8, 1996).
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Commission Against Discrimination announced it will offer voluntary
72
arbitration (and mediation) of discrimination complaints.
The NLRB has issued a complaint against an employer that required
its employees to use mandatory arbitration in a nonunion firm." A
regional office of the NLRB found that such a practice violated the
National Labor Relations Act by impacting the right of employees to
engage 74in protected, concerted activity and by limiting access to the
NLRB
It is now in order to synthesize the reported data and directly
address the issue of desirability, from the point of view of this writer, of
mandatory pre-dispute arbitration agreements in non-union organizations.
VI.

RECOMMENDATIONS-MANDATORY ARBITRATION

A.

Statutory Cases

Plaintiff attorneys believe that mandatory arbitration involving
statutory disputes are illegal. This position was well laid out by Janice
Goodman at an annual meeting of the Labor and Employment section of
the New York State Bar Association. Ms. Goodman took the position
that "mandatory arbitration agreements must fail as involuntary contracts
where employees are forced to waive valuable constitutional and
statutory rights under the threat of termination., 75 One aspect of this
position is the argument that the Federal Arbitration Act covers all
arbitration proceedings involving commerce and prohibits mandatory
arbitration in connection with employment arbitration.
A strong stand on the opposite side was taken by Catherine B.
Hagen and Kathleen B. Hayward.76 They argue that the FAA was
77
basically limited to employment contracts involving transportation.
Therefore, if that is insufficient, relevant state law may make mandatory

72. See id.
73. See Bentley's Luggage, No. 12-CA-16658 (1994); see alsoFeds Oppose Requiring Workers
to Arbitrate, 14 ALTERNATIVES TO HIGH COST LIrIG. 39, 39 (1996) (discussing Bentley's Luggage
facts).
74. See John True, New Rulesfor New Challenges,DISP. RESOL. J., Oct.-Dec. 1995, at 30, 33.
75. Janice Goodman, Mandatory Arbitration is not an Alternative for Employees, Address at
the New York State Bar Association Annual Meeting of the Labor and Employment Law Section
(Jan. 26, 1996) (transcript available from the New York State Bar Association).
76. See Catherine B. Hagen & Kathleen B. Hayward, The Issues Concerning Mandatory
Arbitration,Disp. RESOL. J., Oct.-Dec. 1995, at 23.

77. See id. at 27-28.
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arbitration under an employment contract legal.7" In their otherwise
excellent review, the authors err in equating a collective bargaining
requirement for a grievant to take a statutory case to arbitration with a
mandatory pre-employment arbitration agreement. The problem, of
course, is that an individual signing an individual agreement is not in the
same position as the individual who is part of a bargaining unit in which
the union has been specifically designated to act as the employees' agent
in negotiating terms and conditions of employment.
My sense of the current situation is that we are moving toward
Gilmer as a norm, replacing the succesive venues approach in GardnerDenver. With the EEOC backlog of over 100,000 cases hovering in the
background, the Supreme Court appears to be saying that GardnerDenverreflected a time when the Court was concerned with justice under
collective bargaining agreements when contract clauses causing de facto
discrimination were not uncommon. In effect, the Court indicates that is
no longer a significant problem, and there is no reason for not currently
deferring to arbitration if the process is regular. The Court's conclusion
is reinforced by the effectiveuse of arbitration in state and local court
systems.
At this time, we have not as yet resolved the role of the FAA in
employment cases in general. We have quality standards being adopted
by appointing agencies in a piecemeal fashion. We do not have specific
legislation at either the federal or state level requiring a complete set of
quality standards. What we do have is a gradually evolving set of court
decisions which apply to some but not the broad range of quality
standards. Under these circumstances, I find little reason to move away
from the Gardner-Denverapproach. We should not rush headlong into
arbitration before we have cleared the path by effectuating quality
standards and having appointing agencies recognize a primary responsibility to maintain neutrality in their panels for employment cases. The
answer to the question posed in the title of this article is "No" to the use
of mandatory, pre-arbitration agreements, given present circumstances.
I recognize that Gilmer may well become the order of the day. If
that eventuality occurs, I believe the NLRB and Dunlop Commission
approach of permitting review of arbitration cases on a statutory basis
makes sense. Depending on whether or not quality standards are in place,
the answer to the question posed by the title of this paper becomes
"Maybe." If the quality standards have arisen osmotically by court

78. See id. at 28.
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decision and appointing-agency policy, the courts would do well to
consider these situations on a case-by-case basis as to whether or not
mandatory, pre-employment arbitration is applicable. If some mix of
legislation, appointing-agency action and court decisions have produced
a satisfactory set of quality standards, including statutory review of an
arbitrator's decision by the courts, the answer could become "Yes."
Parenthetically, I note that at least one pair of observers believe that
employers who use mandatory arbitration agreements for statutory cases
may find themselves unwittingly establishing a mechanism for what
previously were employment-at-will cases.79
B. Non-Statutory Cases
In the past, employees dismissed in nonunion settings who come
under a plan calling for arbitration of their cases have at times found the
plans to be lacking in elementary justice. Limitations were present on
such matters as the choice of an arbitrator and advocate, remedies
available and other aspects of arbitral authority. Some observers felt it
was improper for a neutral to become involved in arbitrating such cases.
Others felt that the situation provided the only hope for a dismissed
individual to have some access to industrial justice and thought the cases
proper if the claimant wished to proceed under these circumstances. More
and more, organizations are conscious of criticism of employer plans, and
efforts have been made by the employers involved to make the plans
more acceptable.
However, the issue of mandatory verses voluntary access to
arbitration would not seem to arise if no statutory claim is present. Either
the individual chooses to go to arbitration or not. Those are the available
options. If additional fairness is perceived as desirable by claimants and
their advocates, presumably that will have to wait for legislation
providing for labor court and/or arbitration of dismissal cases under a
statute which has quality standards built in.
A potential problem arises when an employee has elected not to
proceed under the company's plan and chooses to go to court, probably
seeking an equity determination. The employer holding the employee's
signed agreement to arbitrate all employment-based claims may wish to
effectuate the agreement. Should the employer be free to do so?

79. See Stephen L. Hayford & Michael J. Evers, The InteractionBetween the Employment-AtWillDoctrineandEmployer-Employee Agreements to Arbitrate StatutoryFairEmploymentPractices
Claims: Difficult Choicesfor At-Will Employers, 73 N.C. L. REV. 443, 444 (1995).
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One reasonable presumption is that many individuals find today's
job market a difficult one, and they will sign pre-employment agreements
if it will help them obtain work. The signed pre-employment agreement
may well be fully understood by the signatory, but it has been signed
solely because the prospective employee believes no alternative is
available.
In the absence of reasonable quality standards, I believe the courts
should deny arbitration not desired by the dismissed employee. If the
type of quality standards contemplated by the Dunlop Commission and
the Protocol Task Force are present, particularly the right to appeal an
arbitration decision on the grounds the individual initially wished to sue
in court, a modest case can be made for an affirmative answer to the
employer's desire to compel arbitration under a pre-employment
agreement in a non-statutory case. Otherwise, the answer to the question
posed earlier should be "No."
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